Apparently philosophical reflection commenced when the awareness of diversity prompted the contemplation of an underlying unity. Thales found this principle of origination in water. Alongside elements such as water, air and fire as well as the apeiron (the infinite-unbounded) Greek philosophy successively explores different modes of explanation. Number, space and movement were succeeded by hulè and morphè, where these two terms at once captured a connection between the (material) world of becoming and the world of organic life. The combination of matter and form (life) gave rise to the two terms of our investigation: hylozoism and hylomorphism. These terms are also related to the act-potency scheme and they also presuppose the relation between primary matter and substantial form. In the thought of Aristotle one can also identify energeia with entelecheia. As soon as one of the two elements present in the two terms hylozoism and hylomorphism is elevated, a monistic perspective ensues, such as found in the opposition of mechanism and vitalism. These extremes sometimes surface in the shape of physicalism and the idea of an immaterial vital force. During and after the Renaissance, the idea of the mechanisation of the universe emerged, while vitalism continued its aftereffect within biology, articularly seen in the legacy of idealist morphology (Ray and Linnaeus). The Aristotelian-Thomistic substance-concept appeared to have inherent problems. On the basis of experimental data Driesch revived vitalism (and Aristotle's view of an entelechie), but did not succeed in coming to terms with the physical law of nondecreasing entropy -he had to assign the ability to his entelechie to suspend physical laws in order to account for the increasing order found in growing living entities. However, 
FROM DIVERSITY TO AN UNDERLYING UNITY
In our everyday experience we are constantly facing a rich diversity of things, plants, animals, human beings and all kinds of social forms of life and cultural artefacts. It appears as if Greek philosophy emerged when this experience of diversity was related to the search for an underlying unity. A given diversity entails the idea that there are differences between diverse things. Since Thales chose water as this underlying and ultimate element he is accredited as the first Greek philosopher. Copleston holds that since "he assigns water as this element . . . he earns his place of the First Greek philosopher from the fact that he first conceives the notion of Unity in Difference . . . and, while holding fast to the idea of unity, endeavours to account for the evident diversity of the many" (Copleston 1985-I:23) .
This formulation relates the one and the many to unity and multiplicity. The fundamental question is the following: do we have a unity-in-the-multiplicity or is there one or another element within the multiplicity that should be seen as its ultimate and underlying unity? The way in which Copleston phrases this issue suggests the second option. He states: "Philosophy naturally tries to understand the plurality that we experience, its existence and nature, and to understand in this connection means, for the philosopher, to discover an underlying unity or first principle" (Copleston 1985-II: 23 -see Aristotle's discussion in his Metaph. 983b20 ff.; 988a18 ff.; Aristotle 2001:694 and 702) .
The concern here is not on water as such, but on the fact that it serves to express an idea of unity (in diversity). Moreover, water, as the origin (arché) or source in the thought of Thales, is not designated by him as substance, since the term substance is first found in the thought of Ocellus Lukanus (a Pythagorean from the 5 th century). Among the Fragments of Thales one finds a reflection On the Principles (PERI ARXWN). While referring to the first four [elements] he posits water as a unique element (μόνον ντοιχεϊον) (Diels & Kranz 1960:80; B. Angebliche Fragmente, Fragment 3) . Furthermore, already Anaximander viewed the source (arché) of the elements to be something different from them, namely the apeiron (the infinite-unbounded) (Diels & Kranz B. Fr.1) . It may seem as if Anaximander's alternative transcends the diversity of possible elements, but in the final analysis he merely reverts to an alternative understanding of the one and the many (Schrödinger 1956:78) .
The infinite was appreciated as being without an end in a numerical sense -one, another
one, yet another one, and so on without an end, endlessly. And what is unlimited presupposes a spatial awareness of boundaries or limits.
EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE MODES OF EXPLANATION IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Early Greek philosophy commenced by wrestling with two distinct principles of explanation, namely number (the one and the many) and space (the assumed static nature of being).
Parmenides argued against the reality of multiplicity and movement (Zeno) and he characterised being as indivisible (Parmenides B. Fragments 3, 6 and 8; Diels & Kranz 1960:33,35,36) . Copleston mentions Von Weizsäcker who says that it was Leucippus and Democritus "who made the question of the infinite divisibility of matter a basic question of philosophy" (see Copleston 1985-II:500) .
Matter and form
Choosing a basic underlying element anticipates what Aristotle later on designated as ὕλη (hulè) which in turn was translated by Cicero as "materia" (Fischer 1996 :24, note 5). Burnet mentions that Thales, Anaximines and Heraclitus ascribe the property of being alive to material things (Burnet 1908, Introduction, VIII, note 29) . This view combines matter (ὕλη) and life (ζώειν = to live) and it is therefore also known as hylozoism. Matter and life represent two principles of origin which eventually, particularly in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, were captured as matter and form, united in the expression hylomorphism.
However, both these terms are of a fairly recent origin. Cudworth for the first time employed the term hylozoism in 1678 (see Hager 1974 Hager :1237 Hager -1238 , while the term hylomorphism came into use only by the beginning of the 20 th century (see Oeing-Hanhoff 1974 :1236 -1237 ). In the third edition of his well-known Wörterbuch der philsophischen Begriffe (Dictionary of Philosophical Concepts), Eisler did not insert the concept hylomorphism -it is only found in the fourth edition (1927-I:641 ). Yet what these two terms mean is fully known in Greek philosophy.
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The neo-vitalist thinker, E.W. Sinnott, attributes this feature of indivisibility to form. He adheres to a dualistic view similar to what we will find later on in the thought of Haas. Sinnott believes that form does not inhere in units of matter (atoms, molecules and cells), because it is a "category of being very different from matter." Form "consists of relations among particles, of orderly pattern in them. It is a continuous entity and cannot be divided into pieces" (Sinnott 1963:199) .
The form is equated with soul, although Orphism does not accept any immortality of the human soul and also does not observe any intrinsic connection between soul and body because the soul, chained to the "wheel of births," originates in the luminous heavens and constantly appears in different bodies until it returns to its place of origin after the completion of the great astral year. Yet, the Dionysian matter motive, with its eternal flowing stream of life, demands that whatever takes on a form, must return to the formless stream of life. Dooyeweerd states: "The basic conception of hylozoism, where the soul itself is viewed as a material stream of life, does not allow for such a duality. Only the eternally flowing origin, the one divine physis into which everything that has form must return in an eternal cycle, is immortal. Bodily form, on the contrary, is here merely a transitory phase of the stream of life" (Dooyeweerd 2012-I:76) . On the same page he points out that the divine physis as conceived by the Milesians and Heraclitus is an amorphous flowing soul, which is the principle of spontaneous motion. The latter is not understood in its original kinematic meaning but as biotic movement.
The act-potency scheme
Aristotle accepts an original principle of potency (primary matter) and activity (essential form). The latter is connected to goal-directedness or teleology. The term teleology originated from the Greek words telos (τέλος = goal), and logos λόγος = concept). It is used for the first time in a writing of C. Wolff in 1728 (see Busche H. 1998:970) . In the meantime Greek philosophy manages to move away from a flowing element as principle of origin.
Empedocles partially de-divinises the divine principle of origin -by splitting it into a divine part (philia) and a non-divine part (strife) (Empedocles B. Fr.17; Diels & Kranz 1960-I:37) .
With Anaxagoras the nous is seen as self-sufficient, not mixed with anything and independent in itself (Anaxagoras B. Fr. 12; Diels & Kranz 1960-II:37) .
Primary matter and substantial form
The initial restriction to static being in the thought of Parmenides was exceeded in the subsequent struggle with the problem of persistence amidst change. The way in which
Heraclitus struggled with this problem inspired Plato to realise that the world of becoming presupposes something constant and enduring. Aristotle responded to this problem with his concept of substance. His hylomorphism attempts to unite two opposing principles: matter and form. From the perspective of the substance concept it concerns the relation between primary matter and substantial form. Aristotle introduced the former in order to account for that which remains the same throughout change, whereas form is seen as the principle of activity (the potency-act scheme).
The relationship between constancy and change actually concerns the kinematic meaning of uniform (rectilinear) motion and the physical aspect of dynamic changes. 2 In
Greek philosophy yet another aspect entered the scene, namely biotic aspect. Living entities are associated with having a principle of (physical) 
Mechanism and vitalism
Greek philosophy generated the long-standing controversy between mechanism and vitalism. In the ensuing struggle between these two opposites yet another issue had to be dealt with. It concerns the question of whether the universe could be explained in terms of one principle only (monism), or whether two (mutually exclusive) principles are needed (dualism).
Hans Jonas strikingly typifies the monistic forms of vitalism and mechanicism. Unlike dualists, monists do not attempt to reduce reality philosophically to two fundamental principles, but rather posit a single all-inclusive and universally explanatory principle. We may therefore indeed speak of pan-vitalism and pan-mechanicism as monistic stances.
However, Jonas does point out that the traditional conflict within biological thought between 2
In passing we mention that according to Von Fritz, Aristotle's final cause is misunderstood by the modern natural sciences (Von Fritz 1984:126 ff.) .
vitalism and mechanism from its inception is one-sided. When Thales believes that everything lives it is inconceivable for such a view that "life" is not the normal and governing rule in the universe. Jonas remarks: "In such a worldview, death is a puzzle which stares humankind in the face, the antithesis of the natural, self-explanatory and understandable, that which is the common life" (Jonas 1973:20) . The heading of this paragraph is: Panvitalism and the problem of death (Jonas 1973:19) . The opposite view is found in the thought of those who think pan-mechanistically. They emphasise that the phenomenon of life finds itself on the boundary of the encompassing homogeneous physical world.
Quantitatively life is negligible in the immeasurability of cosmic matter; qualitatively it is an exception to the rule of material characteristics; and epistemologically it is the unexplained in the explainable physical universe. "Conceiving life as a problem here means that its strangeness in the mechanical world, which is the reality, is recognised; explaining it means -on this level of the universal ontology of death -denying it, relegating it to a variant of the possibility of the lifeless" (Jonas 1973:23) . This paragraph appears under the heading: Panmechanism and the problem of life (Jonas 1973:22ff.) .
Physicalism and an immaterial vital force
Philosophers soon realised that one cannot define everything, because every definition not only requires the use of certain terms but presupposes the employment of terms that cannot be further defined. Accepting self-evident "primitive" terms avoid the danger of an infinite regress in a demonstration. Aristotle considers this insight to be so deeply rooted in the Greek philosophical mind that not disposing over it demonstrates a lacking intellectual education. In connection with the possibility for the same thing to be and not to be, which, things. Greek philosophy would employ the terms "matter" and "form," whereas the terms hylozoism and hylomorphism are capturing both of them. The efficient cause (in German:
"Wirkursache") specifies the structuring mechanism while the final cause captures what is intended in a teleological (goal-directed) understanding of things.
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The earlier mentioned pan-mechanism and pan-vitalism aim at opposing goals. The former wants to define "life" purely in mechanical (or physical) terms, whereas the latter wants to explore the biotic aspect of organic life as ultimate mode of explanation. 4 The mechanization of nature since the Renaissance is a familiar theme within the domain of the philosophy of science, in particular owing to the well-known work of Dijksterhuis (1969) . It entails that modern physics, until the end of the 19th century, was dominated by the theoretical attempt to explain the universe in terms of "particles-in-motion." (Troll 1973) .
LIMITATIONS OF THE SUBSTANCE CONCEPT
Aristotle assumes that the combination of matter and form yields the substantial unity of an entity. When this view is applied to the relationship between atom and molecule the substantial unity of the latter will eliminate the persistence of atoms with their own substantial unity (see Hoenen 1938:326 Thus Adolf Meyer, in his analysis of the concept of wholeness, holds that the basic conceptions of physics should to be deducible from those of biology while the latter are not reducible to the former. Entropy, for example, would be a special case of biotical disorganisation; the uncertainty principle would follow from the psycho-physical relation; and the principle of relativity would be derivable from the relation between organism and environment (Needham 1968 :27 note 34).
living entities. Hoenen writes: "because a living entity is one substance it cannot be an aggregate of substances. It is a totality; its substantial unity typically belongs to the ens. If the components were actually present in the living entity then it would have been at once actually one and many in substance, thus in the same respect, which is absurd" (Hoenen 1938:325 increase of order will be impossible within them.
Driesch opts for a negative understanding of Aristotelian's vital force (entelecheia).
He holds that the entelechie is a "system of negations" (Driesch 1920:513; 459 ff.) . As such no positive determination is possible: "entelechie" is not mechanical; not equal to energy, not a force, not constant (Driesch 1931:460) , and it is non-spatial (Driesch 1931:513) .
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"een levend wezen, omdat het eene substantie is, kan niet een aggregaat van substaties zijn; het is een totaliteit; het heeft de substantieele eenheid, die het eens eigen is. Waren de componenten er actueel, dan zou het tegelijk actueel één en veel zijn in substantie, dus in hetzelfde opzicht, wat absurd is."
Von Fritz highlights the structural orientation of classical Greek thinking and its difference with the modern concern for predictability. 7 According to him the lack of appreciating this difference caused a misunderstanding of Aristotle's doctrine on teleology.
He refers to the experiments done by Driesch as well as the latter's fruitful but largely neglected theory of structuration (Ordnungslehre -see Von Fritz 1984:126-127 
FROM "SUSPENDING" PHYSICAL LAWS TO OPEN SYSTEMS
However, Driesch's embarrassing proposal, namely to contemplate an entelechie capable of "suspending" physical laws, was soon superseded. This happened when Von Bertalanffy The underlying issue here is the switch from the Greek-Medieval substance concept to the modern natural scientific function concept (Strauss 2013 
A "CENTRAL INSTANCE" AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN (ID)
During the past three decades the traditional vitalistic theories appeared once more in the form of diverse theories of intelligent design. From the perspective of the history of philosophy it continues the Greek idea of a Workmaster (Demiurge). Already in the thought of Anaxagoras the nous is portrayed as the divine form-giver, but over against itself it finds matter as an original principle of origin. In dialogue Timaeus Plato speaks of a demiurge which gives form to this original matter. The term design is the equivalent of the German term Bauplan (structural design) and is employed by (neo-)Darwinists and (neo-)vitalists.
Even Stephen Gould oftentimes employs the term Bauplan in his last large work on the structure of evolutionary theory (see for example Gould 2002 Gould :582, 1156 Gould , 1198 Gould , 1202 .
In his version of neo-vitalism the biologist Johannes Haas ascribes an inherent law or programme to a living entity, preferably designated as its life plan: "The life plan contains as components the blueprints of each of its expressions; the genetic plan for their succession; the functional plan for carrying out its activities; the behavioural plan for all its 'acts' " (Haas 1974:336) . These life plans have an ideal being and do not allow a physicalchemical explanation: "Physical-chemical forces and laws are in themselves unable to bring forth the structures of meaning which we identify as the life plan, and even less can it produce a non-material bearer of life plans" (Haas 1974:355) .
Following the above-mentioned idealistic-morphology of Troll (1973:19 ff.) , Walter
Heitler speaks of a Zentralinstanz which must exist in every organism (Heitler 1976:6) . He employs this expression in an attempt to avoid physicalism. He calls upon the totality character of typical living entities, since neither physics nor chemistry is acquainted with a genuine concept of a Gestalt or Ganzheit (Heitler 1976:3) . There is a "central instance"
directing the teleological operations of living things. Heitler calls it the "biologischen Instanz"
(biological instance) which specifies also the sub-instances (Unter-Instanzen) of organs, cells, and organelles (Heitler 1976:16) .
According to Von Bertalanffy the modern intellectual development commenced with the mathematical more geometrico approach, followed by the mechanistic world view. He is convinced that the organismic world view supersedes the just-mentioned developments:
First came the developments of mathematics, and correspondingly philosophies after the pattern of mathematics -more geometrico according to Spinoza, Descartes and other contemporaries. This was followed by the rise of physics;
classical physics found its world-view in mechanistic philosophy, the play of material units, the world as chaos ... Lately, biology and the sciences of man come to the fore. And here organization appears as the basic concept -an organismic world-view taking account of those aspects of reality neglected previously (Von Bertalanffy 1968:66) .
The complexities involved in the relationship between the chemical building blocks of living entities and their biotic properties (such as growth, maturation, ageing, adaptation, differentiation and integration) became so overwhelming that within neo-vitalist circles
Aristotle was criticised as a vitalistic monist (Haas 1968:39) . He argues that the Aristotelian conception regarding the role of matter within an organism cannot be maintained. He states that within living entities matter functions within its own sphere and does not obtain it from the "forma substantialis" as claimed by Aristotle. 9 However, it is a pity that Haas understands the intertwinement of the physical and biotic dimensions of organisms in terms of a dualistic perspective: "The being of organisms therefore include two mutually different realities, a material and an immaterial component, from an ontological perspective they therefore have a dualistic constitution" (Haas 1968:39) .
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As an effect of the increasing detail-knowledge regarding the micro-dimensions of living entities, various scholars recently increasingly call for an acknowledgment of these complexities while confessing our ignorance regarding 
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(ii) The concern that the standard gene-centric approach of neo-Darwinism cannot account for the epigenetic source of complex new body plans. (What is needed for mutations "to produce new animal body plans," namely "beneficial regulatory changes expressed early in development" do not occur (Meyer 2013:262 the origin of such genes through de novo ('out of nowhere') origination" (Meyer 2013:216 looking for causes is much more difficult than simply recognising that a chick will mature into a chicken -an ordinary experience of teleology within our everyday lives (Von Fritz 1984:126) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since theory formation always explores certain modes of explanation, the effect of elevating one mode of explanation above all others normally results in the theoretical perspective of a monistic orientation. Interestingly, it was precisely these monistic inclinations, already found 11 Sterelny points out that the standard (neo-)Darwinian account runs "slap-bang into a nasty fact," namely that about 530 million years ago most "major animal groups appeared simultaneously". He continues: "In the 'Cambrian explosion', we find segmented worms, velvet worms, starfish and their allies, mollusks (snails, squid and their relatives), sponges, bivalves and other shelled animals appearing all at once, with their basic organization, organ systems, and sensory mechanisms already operational. We do not find crude prototypes of, say, starfish or trilobites. Moreover, we do not find common ancestors of these groups (Sterelny, 2001:89-90; New Edition 2007:116). in Greek philosophy, that served the on-going scientific development in the West in discerning what is truly irreducible.
The monistic thesis of the Pythagoreans, namely that everything is number, through the discovery of irrational numbers caused a switch in orientation within Greek thinking towards the geometrisation of mathematics. According to Stafleu they have shown that "spatial relations cannot be explained by numerical relations" (Stafleu 1987:61) . Wieland correctly defends the view that this development resulted in the recognition of the fact that the continuum is irreducible (Wieland 1962:287) . The founder of intuitionistic mathematics, LEJ Brouwer, defends a similar view in his dissertation of 1907. John Bell mentions that for
Brouwer "continuity and discreteness" are "complementary notions, neither of which is reducible to each other" (Bell 2006:217) while fully paying attention to Aristotle, who was the first to undertake a "systematic analysis of continuity and discreteness" (Bell 2006:30) .
Aristotle consistently rejected the idea that continuity could be derived from distinct elements (see Bell 2006:32-34) .
Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle contemplated the problem of constancy and change in reaction to the one-sided emphasis of Heraclitus on change. Zeno's paradoxes actually demonstrated the irreducibility of movement to space. Stafleu declares: "Zeno's paradoxes
can be interpreted to demonstrate that motion cannot be explained by numerical and spatial relations." Alternatively, Zeno's paradoxes may be seen as a means of accepting motion "as an unexplained principle of explanation" (Stafleu 1987:61) .
Both Plato and Aristotle realised that change presupposes persistence. The material world of becoming correlates with Plato's supra-sensory static ideas and with Aristotle's universal substantial forms, which are also not subject to change. However, the notion of form remained ambiguous since it could be related both to the physical and the biotic.
Regardless of whether or not "matter" (the physical) or "life" (the biotical) is assumed to be the primary reality, these elements are still present both in hylozoism and hylomorphism.
This shows that these two terms indeed still capture an element of the lasting influence of Greek philosophy in the intellectual legacy of the West.
